Indigenous rights vs agrarian reform in Indonesia: a case study from Jambi by unknown
No Need for Panic: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia ©2013 IPAC             A
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS VS 
AGRARIAN REFORM IN INDONESIA: 




I. Overview ......................................................................................................... 1
II. The Blurring of Agrarian and Indigenous Rights ...................................... 2
III. Background to the SAD113 Conflict .......................................................... 5
IV. The Next Decade ............................................................................................ 6
 A. The CDC Era: The 1,000 Hectare Solution....................................... 7
 B. The PERSADA Experience ................................................................. 8
V. The Wilmar Years ........................................................................................... 9
 A. Mediation ............................................................................................10
 B. A Second Round of Negotiations ....................................................11
 C. Mass Action ........................................................................................11
VI. The “Temporary Solution” of 2,000 Hectares ...........................................15
 A. More Mass Actions ............................................................................16
 B. Land Allocation .................................................................................18
 C. Conflict Resolved? .............................................................................21 
VII. Migrants, Land Sales and Oil Palm “Theft” ..............................................21
 A. Land Sales ...........................................................................................21
 B. Oil Palm “Theft”.................................................................................22
VIII. Lessons from Jambi .....................................................................................24
IX. Conclusion ....................................................................................................26
Appendix A
 Map of PT Asiatic Persada and Jambi Province .......................................28
Indigenous Rights vs Agrarian Reform in Indonesia: A Case Study from Jambi ©2014 IPAC             1
I .  OVERVIEW
A longstanding land conflict in Jambi province, Sumatra, highlights the tension between two 
strands of civil society: the movement to protect indigenous rights and the movement for agrar-
ian reform. As the former succeeds in drawing attention to customary (adat) land unfairly taken 
in the past for corporate concessions, the latter sees the same land in terms of its potential for 
redistribution to the poor far beyond just the indigenous claimants. The goals of both move-
ments are legitimate: customary groups deserve restitution for past injustices, including return 
of land wrongfully taken, while access to land could significantly improve the lives of the 14.4 
per cent of rural Indonesians living below the poverty line. The problem is that using adat land 
as the vehicle for agrarian reform may be planting the seeds of future conflict between indigenous 
groups and migrants while doing little to address the needs of the landless poor. The problem 
is exacerbated by the lack of any workable mechanism to adjudicate land conflicts quickly, 
decisively and fairly, leading some groups to conclude that the only way they can get attention to 
their cause is by mass action – and sometimes violence. Establishing such a mechanism should 
be an urgent priority of Indonesia’s next government.
Across Indonesia, and particularly in Sumatra, poor farmers have been displaced by rapid 
agrarian change that has seen land once used for shifting cultivation transformed from forests to 
timber concessions to plantation agriculture in just a few decades. In 1968, for example, Indone-
sia had 120,000 hectares (ha) of land under oil palm cultivation; today it has at least 10.8 million 
ha, with over 600,000 ha added each year.1 Many of the original adat owners lost their land to 
these concessions, sometimes with nominal compensation, often with none and almost never 
with full information about what was happening. The process also generated major demograph-
ic shifts as landless and land-poor migrants from other areas poured in to look for work or set-
tle on newly cleared land. Some of this influx was through the state-sponsored transmigration 
program, especially in the 1980s, but much of it was spontaneous, and many of the new settlers 
found themselves competing with adat groups for scarce land or uprooted in turn as palm oil 
cultivation expanded. 
The Jambi conflict illustrates the complexities involved. Since 2003, an indigenous group 
known as SAD113 has been trying to recover 3,550 hectares of customary land that the In-
donesian government ceded to a palm oil company in 1986, at the height of Soeharto’s New 
Order. SAD is an acronym for Suku Anak Dalam (literally, “tribes of the interior”); the 113 is 
the number of original claimants. The land in question included smallholder rubber plots, fields 
used for shifting cultivation, residential areas, gravesites and secondary forest, all of which the 
claimants and their families considered customary land, in use by their families for generations. 
From 2006 to 2011, the group tried to negotiate with the company, PT Asiatic Persada, through 
an NGO-led mediation process, to recover the land. Frustrated by the failure of these mediation 
efforts, SAD113 turned to the National Farmers Union (Serikat Tani Nasional, STN), the peas-
ant wing of the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), a leftwing party 
established in 1996 by radical students. 
PRD/STN used mass action in front of television cameras to attract the support of politi-
cians and bureaucrats. To get more people on the streets and to raise funds for the struggle, it 
encouraged non-indigenous migrants to join in. In some cases, SAD113 members sold these 
outsiders land, promising two-ha plots once the land was returned in exchange for a significant 
payment up front. They drew in others to help harvest oil palm fruit from the concession area, 
1 The 1968 figure come from Departemen Pertanian, “Prospek dan Arah Pengembangan Agribusnis Kelapa Sawit”, 2007, p. 
4. The 2013 figure is from the Ministry of Agriculture website, www.pertanian.go.id/infoeksekutif/bun/IP%20ASEM%20
BUN%202013/Produksi-KelapaSawit.pdf. According to the NGO Sawit Watch, however, Indonesia had 15,337,673 ha un-
der oil palm cultivation by late 2013. See Sawit Watch, Tandan Sawit, No.3, December 2013, p.19. 
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even though the company and the police considered this theft. “Theft” led to arrests, arrests to 
protests, protests to violence and forced evictions in a regular cycle, but all this just helped raise 
the profile of the struggle. It also raised the profile of the local PRD/STN coordinator who 
decided to run for a seat in the provincial assembly.
Up to a point, the confrontation strategy worked. In 2012, PRD/STN secured an agreement 
from all parties, including the company, that the 3,550 ha should be returned in full, contingent 
on a mapping of the area that the company would have to fund. When the company stalled on 
providing the funds, no government agency was willing or able to force it to do so. In late 2013, 
with the April 2014 national elections providing a convenient deadline to focus all energies, the 
company offered a different solution. All those verified as “indigenous” would receive a two-ha 
plot in a smaller abandoned concession area adjoining the main plantation. Many accepted, 
despairing of getting anything better. PRD/STN is still holding out for the full package, but its 
SAD clients are dwindling. The hundreds of migrant families who poured in to Jambi over the 
past five years, lured by the promise of cheap land, may find they are left with nothing. 
The ramifications of this battle go far beyond Jambi. Across Indonesia, as land and resource 
conflicts fester, groups like PRD/STN are moving in to exploit struggles over customary land 
for their own political agendas. That agenda may be noble, such as securing land for the poor. 
But in the process, they are encouraging adat groups to expand their ranks to the point that the 
concept of historic, descent-based claims loses all meaning. Worse, indigenous status becomes 
a commodity that can be bought and sold. When large numbers of migrants are encouraged to 
join (and contribute financially to) the struggle to recover land, and then the government moves 
in with a legal regime for indigenous groups only, the unintended consequence may be a new 
form of conflict between locals and migrants. This problem may become more acute if a new 
draft law on indigenous rights is adopted by the Indonesian parliament or if a May 2012 decision 
by the Constitutional Court to remove “indigenous forests” from state control moves toward 
implementation. 
The competition among NGOs adds another layer of complexity to the difficulty of resolving 
land conflicts in Indonesia, where the obstacles are already legion: lack of good cadastral records, 
poor maps, contradictory laws and regulations, confusing lines of bureaucratic authority, corrupt 
courts and poorly trained officials. Addressing all of these weaknesses should be high on the 
agenda of a new government, but change will be slow in coming. In the short term, the best hope 
of resolution may lie in continued international and local pressure on corporations to adopt and 
apply codes of ethics on human rights and sustainability, combined with skilled local mediators.
II .  THE BLURRING OF AGRARIAN AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
The efforts to occupy and reclaim land from corporations and the state in Jambi are replicated 
across Indonesia. They stem from a movement that predates by almost a decade the fall of Indo-
nesia’s authoritarian government in 1998 but was given a major new impetus thereafter.2 Land 
claims surged, as newfound freedoms of expression and association allowed farmers to register 
grievances and demand the return of land given away by the Soeharto government without con-
sideration for customary claims. In some cases it was given in the form of plantation, timber or 
mining concessions, in others, set aside for transmigration programs, and in still others, deemed 
state forest and no longer available to the people who lived off its products. In some areas, 
2 For background on the agrarian rights movement, see Anton Lucas and Carole Warren, Land for the People: The State and 
Agrarian Conflict in Indonesia, Athens, Ohio, 2014; Noer Fauzi Rachman, The Resurgence of Land Reform Policy and Agrari-
an Movements in Indonesia, Ph.D. dissertation,University of California, Berkeley, 2011; and Suraya Abdulwahab Afiff, Land 
Reform or Customary Rights? Contemporary Agrarian Struggles in South Tapanuli, Indonesia, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of California, Berkeley, 2004.
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farmers spontaneously occupied the land they claimed; in others, activists helped mobilise mass 
occupations. 
From the beginning, agrarian, indigenous and environmental activists had different agendas. 
The agrarian reform activists were the most radical, many grouped into peasant unions. They 
also included many respected scholar-activists, represented by the Consortium for Agrarian 
Reform (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, KPA), an NGO coalition that had been working since 
in 1995 to change agrarian policies. They hoped to revive the spirit of the 1960 Basic Agrarian 
Law with its major tenets of land to the tiller; no absentee land ownership; government-deter-
mined limits on landholding and redistribution of the excess; equitable sharing of between own-
er and tiller; and protection of the economically weak.3 These progressive aspects of the 1960 law 
were downplayed by the Soeharto government, which associated land reform with the banned 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Instead, the law’s provisions on 
the central management role of the state were frequently used to justify land acquisition at the 
expense of smallholders, indigenous groups and tenant farmers. The new generation of agrarian 
activists, many using socialist principles that they now could promote more openly, hoped to 
reclaim much of that land through occupation, while trying to press for pro-poor policies and 
laws that would guard against future land grabs. STN was only one of several peasant unions 
involved.4
By contrast, the environmental movement was initially more focused on forests. The 1967 
Forestry Law had classified 70 per cent of Indonesian land area as state forest, bringing it under 
the control of the Ministry of Forestry, and allowing the state to determine whether it would be 
zoned for production (timber, rubber, industrial trees); conversion to agriculture; or conser-
vation. One result was the destruction of huge tracts of rainforest as the Soeharto government 
handed out timber and plantation concessions with little concern for environmental impact or 
sustainability. Another was that local communities were denied not only control over but often 
access to land that they considered theirs by customary right. Recognising that these commu-
nities were often the best stewards of the forests, environmental activists found common cause 
with indigenous rights groups.5
The indigenous rights strand of Indonesian civil society goes back decades. It began to take 
shape as a more organised nationwide movement in 1993, however, and took off in 1999 with 
the founding of the National Alliance of Indigenous Peoples (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusan-
tara, AMAN)—at which KPA was present. AMAN quickly moved the agenda beyond commu-
nity forest management to campaign for an end to state control over customary land. It defined 
indigenous peoples (masyarakat adat) as “communities living on the basis of ancestral origins 
in an adat region, that have sovereignty over land and natural resource wealth; a sociocultural 
life regulated by adat law; and an adat council that manages the daily life of its people.” By 2014, 
AMAN claimed to be representing well over 2,000 indigenous communities. Its signature victo-
ry was the decision by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in May 2013 to remove customary 
forests from state control, although implementation remains a long way off.6 
AMAN and the peasant unions campaigning for agrarian reform have very different un-
derstandings about claims to adat lands. AMAN sees the ultimate goal as recovering land for a 
distinct group of people who have historic and collective rights to it. The unions see the ultimate 
3 Mohamad Shohibuddin and M. Nazar Salim, “Pembentukan Kebijakan Reforma Agraria, 2006-2007”, Sayogyo Institute, 
2012, p.793.
4 Examples are Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI) and Aliansi Gerakan Reformasi Agraria (AGRA) at the national level and sev-
eral local variants, including Serikat Petani Pasundan in West Java; Serikat Petani Riau in Riau; and Serikat Petani Sriwijaya 
in South Sumatra.
5 Afiff, op.cit. pp.88-91.
6 Constitutional Court ruling No.35/PUU-X/2012 was made in response to an AMAN-led petition to review the 1999 For-
estry Law. For an English version, see www.rightsandresources.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=6240. 
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goal as recovering as much land as possible that can then be redistributed to the landless and 
land-poor, indigenous and migrant alike. AMAN sees this not only as unwarranted exploitation 
of adat claims but also as usurpation by the unions of what should be a state responsibility – in 
this case, land reform. The unions see AMAN as committed to a static concept of adat and in-
sufficiently concerned with class. Both fault the government for failing to work out a workable 
mechanism for the resolution of land disputes.
The unwillingness of some companies to acknowledge past injustices or search in good faith 
for solutions has led some adat groups to open their ranks to migrants in the belief that strength 
lies in numbers, and that politicians and corporate officials only respond to mass action.
The fear of having their land confiscated—especially land designated as state forest—by 
private companies or government projects often drives locals to use land-shared tenancies 
with migrants as part of a strategy to protect their land. Migrants are now seen as integral 
to the local communities’ strategies for realizing and protecting their local land rights 
from government or private sector encroachment and inequitable resource allocation.7
This perceived need for numbers because nothing else works feeds into the strategy of the peas-
ant unions to use adat claims for broader goals.
In the early days of reformasi, as the post-Soeharto era is known, the three groups worked 
together with a unity of purpose that in 2001 achieved a major victory: a Decree on Agrarian 
Reform and Natural Resources Management from the country’s highest legislative body, the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR).8 Even then, though, 
one of the peasant unions, Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI), denounced the decree as a dangerous 
entry point for a “neo-liberal and imperialist agenda”.9 
Gradually more fault-lines began to emerge, sometimes sectoral as different agendas of the 
agrarian, environmental and adat movements led in different directions, sometimes ideological 
as splinters emerged in each sector.10
The Jambi conflict reflects these competing NGO strategies and tactics: radical versus moder-
ate, land reform versus adat rights, confrontation versus mediation. For all the tensions among 
civil society groups, however, they close ranks in response to any use of violence by state security 
forces or company guards, regardless of the circumstances – and land protests are not always 
peaceful. They frequently involve threatened or actual attacks against company property, in the 
context of failure to gain redress for or attention to perceived injustice, and the victims in out-
breaks of land violence are as likely to die at the hands of a mob as at the hands of police or 
guards.11 Nevertheless, a disproportionate security response inevitably makes things worse. As 
a new government explores new approaches to land conflicts in the future, it needs to pay close 
attention to how security is handled and ensure that all those responsible for violence are held 
accountable.
7 Gamma Galudra, Mene van Noordwijk, Putra Agung, Suyanto Suyanto and Ujjwal Pradhan, “Migrants, Land Markets 
and Carbon Emissions in Jambi, Indonesia: Land Tenure Change and the Prospect of Emission Reduction”, Mitigation and 
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 18 October 2013.
8 Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, “The State, the People and Their Mediators: The Struggle over Agrarian Law Reform in 
Post-New Order Indonesia”, Indonesia, No.76 (October 2003), pp. 87-126. 
9 Noer Fauzi, op. cit., p.62
10 The big environmental movement, Walhi, moved closer to the agrarian activists and away from groups promoting of REDD 
(reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation), which they saw as only serving to give a fig-leaf to expan-
sion of corporate interests. “Interview with Teguh Surya, WALHI”, www.redd-monitor.org.
11 Of 22 fatalities in land conflicts in 2013 listed by the respected KPA, six were security personnel killed by farmers; seven 
were farmers killed by security personnel; three were company employees killed by farmers; and seven were farmers killed 
by other farmers. KPA kindly provided the list of names, and IPAC researchers checked news accounts of the incidents.
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III .  BACKGROUND TO THE SAD113 CONFLICT
The conflict involving a group in Jambi province known as “SAD 113” may be one of the best 
documented land conflicts in Indonesia. International and local NGOs have reported on it in 
copious detail, it has been the subject of academic research and the National Human Rights 
Commission (KOMNAS-HAM) has three cartons of documents on it from complaints it has 
received over the years. It is nevertheless poorly understood and often misreported.
SAD is short for Suku Anak Dalam, “tribes of the interior”, a generic name applied without 
much rigour to all indigenous groups in the area. SAD113 was originally a group of related fam-
ilies in a larger community known collectively as Bathin IX that traces its descent from brothers 
who settled along nine local rivers. The “113” refers to the number of original claimants, all from 
the hamlets of Tanah Menang, Pinang Tinggi and Padang Salak in an area that cuts across two 
districts, Batang Hari and Muaro Jambi.12
By the terms of the 1967 Forestry Law, vast swathes of Jambi were designated as state-con-
trolled forest area (kawasan hutan negara). Beginning in 1971, the Soeharto government began 
handing out timber concessions, with one company alone, PT Asialog, receiving 72,000 ha.13 
The concessions often ignored indigenous communities and logged the forest on which they 
depended for their livelihoods. They drew an influx of migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia to 
work as loggers or in sawmills. Eventually the area was effectively logged out, making it ripe for 
conversion to plantation land, as the agribusiness boom, particularly palm oil, began to take off 
in the 1980s. To get a permit (Hak Guna Usaha, HGU) for plantation agriculture, however, the 
land first had to be officially “released” by the Forestry Ministry, a requirement that was some-
times overlooked. 
In 1985, the governor of Jambi “reserved” 40,000 ha of Jambi’s forest area for a log-
ging-turned-plantation company called PT Bangun Desa Utama (BDU), owned by a prominent 
family from Palembang, South Sumatra.14 In 1986, as it was negotiating with the Forestry Minis-
try for the release of 30,000 ha of the reserved land, PT BDU received a permit to use 20,000 ha 
of it for palm oil and cacao. The concession included the three SAD113 hamlets.15 
In July 1987, after undertaking a “micro-survey” of the site, the Directorate of Inventory and 
Forest Land Use within the Forestry Ministry gave preliminary approval to the release of 27,150 
ha, but it noted that the land in question contained 2,100 ha of cultivated fields, 1,400 ha of land 
left fallow from shifting cultivation (belukar), and 50 ha of residential area that the company 
would have to “resolve”.16 This is the basis that SAD113 has used to argue ever since that BDU 
and its successors took 3,550 ha of customary land. A map was attached to the approval letter 
showing precisely where the fields were located, although when the SAD113 claim first surfaced, 
no one could find the map.
The company’s 1986 permit contained a standard clause about communities that inconve-
niently happened to live on concession land:
If in the area given over to this concession there remain permanent residential and culti-
12 IPAC interview, SAD113 leaders, Jambi, February 2014.
13 “PT”, short for perseroan terbatas, is the Indonesian equivalent of “Ltd” or limited company.
14 The land was reserved through a decree of the Jambi governor No. 188.4/599/1985. PT BDU, 3 December 1985, was part of 
the Asiatic Mas Corporation, owned by a Palembang businessman, Andi Senangsyah.
15 The fact that no release had been formally approved has been used by SAD113 to argue that the whole permit (HGU) was 
illegal from the beginning and should be revoked. The HGU does, however, refer to several other documents the company 
received from the ForestryMinistry, approving in principle the conversion of a forest area with the status of limited produc-
tion forest (hutan produksi terbatas, HPT) to agricultural uses. “SALINAN Surat Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 
SK.46/HGU/DA/86.
16 Badan Inventarisasi dan Tata Guna Hutan Jakarta, Letter informing of approval for the release of forest area in the amount 
of 27,150 ha for a palm oil and cacao plantation to PT Bangun Desa Utama in Jambi, No.393/VII-4/1987.
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vated areas that existed before the concession came into being, then it is the obligation/
responsibility of the beneficiary to find a solution in the best possible way according to 
existing regulations.17
The “solution” could have involved reserving these areas as an enclave that would not be dis-
turbed, or involving the farmers in the plantation as smallholders, but neither transpired. The 
SAD 113 communities had little information about what was happening. Their leaders say the 
company promised them that 1,500 ha would be set aside for a smallholder program and as part 
of this, they signed what they believed was an agreement to set up a cooperative.18 Whatever the 
nature of this agreement, nothing materialised. Instead, the Indonesian military began putting 
pressure on the SAD113 families to leave. 
As systematic planting of oil palm began, evictions were stepped up. In two of the hamlets, 
Padang Salak and Pinang Tinggi, almost all the families were forced to leave, according to lead-
ers, while in the third, Tanah Menang, dozens managed to stay. The result was that the SAD113 
families were dispersed in different communities, though most stayed as close by as they could 
manage.19 Many of the SAD113 continued to cultivate smallholder rubber on an enclave of 241 
ha that had been left alone by the company. Some ended up as wage labourers on the plantation, 
some scavenged fallen fruit, many others left to find work elsewhere, many in the nearby village 
of Markanding.20 
In 1992, the official “release” from the Ministry of Forestry was finally granted, six years after 
the fact, for the full 27,150 ha. Shortly thereafter, PT BDU officially turned its concession over to 
a new company with the same owners called PT Asiatic Persada or PT Asiatic, for short. 
Over the next five years, planting was set back, first by drought, fires and wild boars, then 
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The crisis helped bring down Indonesian President Soeharto 
a year later and ushered in a series of sweeping reforms in all fields. The palm oil industry was 
affected by several of the reforms put in place to try and stem “corruption, collusion and nepo-
tism”, the phrase that came to symbolise the later years of the Soeharto government. One of these 
was a regulation that limited the size of plantation concessions operated by a single company 
to 20,000 ha.21 This meant that PT Asiatic, with its 27,150 ha, was too big. Its owners therefore 
used two subsidiaries to absorb the excess, PT Jammer Tulen and PT Maju Perkasa Sawit. These 
smaller concessions became an important part of the story later, as the company began to look 
for a way to address the claims. 
IV. THE NEXT DECADE
The fall of Soeharto in 1998 led to a series of dramatic changes in Indonesia, in Jambi and on 
the plantation itself. In the decade between 2000 and 2010, PT Asiatic changed hands three 
times, from the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC); very briefly, in 2006, to the 
US giant Cargill; and finally a few months later, to Asia’s largest palm oil producer, the Wilmar 
17 Ibid., p.2.
18 Marcus Colchester, Patrick Anderson, Asep Yunan Firdaus, Fatilda Hasibuan and Sophie Chao, “Human Rights Abuses 
and Land Conflicts in the PT Asiatic Persada Concession in Jambi”, Report of Forest Peoples Programme, Sawit Watch and 
HuMa, 2011, p.17.
19 Interview, SAD113 leaders, Jambi, 6 March 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 This was Plantation Use Permit Regulation, 107/Kpts-II/1999 from the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops. See Ann 
Casson, “The Hesitant Boom: Indonesia’s Oil Palm Sub-Sector in an era of Economic Crisis and Political Change”, CIFOR, 
November 1999, p.25.
Indigenous Rights vs Agrarian Reform in Indonesia: A Case Study from Jambi ©2014 IPAC             7
Group.22 From 2003 onwards, taking advantage of democratic space, the SAD113 farmers began 
more organised efforts to recover their land, starting with protests, experimenting with medi-
ation and then, as mediation failed, turning back to more organised mass action campaigns. 
Along the way, dozens of NGOs and mass organisations championed their cause, often in com-
petition with one another, and many other groups – more than two dozen composed of SAD 
families, a few of them mixed with or mostly migrants -- emerged with their own land claims 
against the company. 
A. The CDC Era: The 1,000 Hectare Solution
In 2000, PT Asiatic was sold to CDC working together with a Singapore-based company, Pacific 
Rim or Pacrim. Shortly thereafter, the new management decided to try and resolve at least some 
of the conflicts with the various communities by offering 1,000 ha as part of a “partnership” pro-
gram in which the farmers would form a cooperative, receive training in oil palm cultivation, 
tend the trees, and after they began bearing fruit, sell only to the company. Of the 1,000 ha, 400 
ha was to be located in the northern part of the main concession and 600 ha further south. Under 
the proposal, each SAD family would receive a two-ha plot. The costs of developing the land 
would be borne by the farmers, with credit and inputs through a government program known as 
Members’ Primary Credit Cooperative (Koperasi Kredit Primer Anggota, KKPA). The company 
would provide production assistance, and once debts were paid off, a share of the profits.23 An 
agreement in principle between the company and the SAD groups was signed in April 2001.24 
It sounded good; it is clear that many of the proposed beneficiaries were confused about what 
it actually entailed and did not understand that they would be locked into an arrangement that 
would be difficult to break off and could produce long-term debt.25
The wheels of the Indonesian bureaucracy moved very, very slowly, however, and it was not 
until almost two years later that a team headed by a local government official finished iden-
tifying candidates for the program. Each candidate had to be verified as indigenous, and this 
was easier said than done. Over the years, migrants streaming into Jambi from other areas had 
swelled SAD113’s numbers in three ways. One was through marriage. As with other SAD 
groups, marriages outside the clan were common, and any children produced had full rights 
to customary land through either parent. As the struggle to regain the land progressed, adat 
leaders encouraged “strategic marriages” between SAD women and non-SAD men, in part for 
numbers, in part for strength: outsiders were seen as more willing to challenge authority.26 Non-
SAD men who married SAD women were known as semendo and fully accepted as indigenous, 
but doubts began to emerge early on about the padding of SAD113 ranks by migrants who had 
simply joined the group, with no pretence of adat status. 
22 Wilmar International Ltd was founded in 1991 by Martua Sitorus, from Medan, Sumatra, one of Indonesia’s richest men; 
and Kuok Khoon Hong, the Singapore-based nephew of Malaysian magnate Robert Kuok. It is now headquartered in Sin-
gapore, has over 450 manufacturing plants and boasts a workforce worldwide of some 90,000 people. See www.wilmar-in-
ternational.com. 
23 IPAC has not been able to find the exact terms of what they were offered. The KKPA partnership model was in widespread 
use at the time, a replacement for the nucleus estate-smallholder program that had prevailed in the later years of the Soe-
harto government. Cooperatives could borrow up to Rp.50 million (about $5,000) at a subsidized repayment rate of about 
16 per cent. See Sonja Vermeulen and Nathalie Goad, “Towards Better Practice in Smallholder Palm Oil Production”, 
International Institute for Environment and Development, London, 2006, p.20.
24 Rukaiyah Rofiq, “CDC Pacrim, Satu Lagi Perusahaan Sawit Skala Besar Ikut-Ikutan Merambah Hutan, Lahan, dan Hak 
Masyarakat Adatdi Kalimantan dan Sumatra, Jakarta”, 2004, pp.22-23. The groups that would share the northern swathe 
were SAD113; a group from a hamlet known as Pompa Air; and a few smaller descent groups. The southern chunk would 
go to a group from Penyerukan that for years had been trying to recover 5,100 ha taken by the company.
25 John McCarthy, “’Where is Justice?’ Resource Entitlements, Agrarian Transformation and Regional Autonomy in Jambi, 
Sumatra”, forthcoming, pp.7-8.
26 IPAC interview, NGO leaders, Jambi, 6 February 2014.
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Minutes from a January 2003 meeting show the numbers eventually registered were 99 fam-
ilies from Markanding village (including the SAD113 group) and 49 families from Bukit Mak-
mur village.27 The exact sites on the concession where the partnership program was to take 
place, however, had not been chosen.
All of these delays, combined with poor information and continued destruction of trees and 
gravesites as planting by the company went ahead, alienated the families that had initially been 
willing to give it a try. SAD113 members became convinced that the PT Asiatic offered the part-
nership simply to lure them off the small patches of their land that they continued to occupy.
B. The PERSADA Experience 
If SAD113’s experience with the 400 ha offer was bad, another SAD group’s was even worse. 
Known as PERSADA (an acronym for Persatuan Suku Anak Dalam), this was a descent group 
that could trace its lineage back at least nine generations. Its customary land consisted of 5,100 
ha on the border of Batang Hari and Muaro Jambi districts.28 In 2000, members formed a co-
operative to take advantage of the palm oil boom and try and attract investors themselves. They 
joined forces with a group of about 600 non-SAD farmers and applied to the district govern-
ment for a “location permit” for a plantation.29 
In mid-2001, the Muaro Jambi district government gave a “permit in principle” to plant, 
contingent on having the area mapped by the local land office and getting a permit from the 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops.30 The Muaro Jambi district land office duly came, but 
said their coordinates showed that the land was actually within the jurisdiction of Batang Hari, 
the next district over; even worse, it was in the concession area of PT Asiatic. This was the first 
inkling the families had that their land was gone.
In January 2002, officials from the company and the PERSADA farmers agreed that in com-
pensation for the land lost to the concession, the company would provide the 600 ha in partner-
ship and turn over an additional 50 ha for housing and other facilities. They promised the 600 
ha would be close to their existing hamlet and that planting of oil palm “for those SAD entitled 
to it”—i.e., no migrants—would begin as soon as possible, once a suitable location had been 
determined. To determine who had a right to the 600 ha, there would be a verification process, 
coordinated by the district government.
To manage the 600 ha, the group set up a new cooperative called KOPSAD that came into be-
ing in November 2003, registered by the State Minister for Cooperatives and Small and Medium 
Enterprises. Despite repeated meetings, however, there was little progress on the partnership. 
In 2005, the PERSADA group and the company finally agreed on a location for the 600 ha with 
the costs of development to be borne by the farmers. Still nothing happened, in part because of 
disagreements between the districts about where their boundaries lay. The next year, PT Asiatic 
was sold to the Wilmar Group, and negotiations ceased.
Looking back, the period of CDC control was one point at which the conflict might have 
been resolved had there been better coordination and consultation and less red tape -- and if 
the company from the beginning had left important parts of customary land, such as gravesites, 
27 Notes of meeting on 23 January 2003 led by the subdistrict head of Sungai Bahar as head of theTim Khusus Seleksi dan 
Penempatan Petani Suku Anak Dalam. According to the note, an additional 38 families from Markanding were to be settled 
on a state plantation, Perkebunan Nusantara VI, that adjoined the company’s.
28 Muaro Jambi was carved out of Batang Hari in 1999, creating administrative confusion, since some of PT Asiatic’s confu-
sion, since some of PT Asiatic’s concession area fell within the new district but the plantation as a whole was administered 
from Batang Hari.
29 The full name is Koperasi Kesejahteran Himpunan Insan Pers Seluruh Indonesia.
30 Under President Habibie, the Ministry of Forestry was put in charge of plantations as well and the name was changed to 
reflect this.
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untouched.31 The SAD groups, unlike some of their NGO advocates, were not against oil palm; 
they wanted a share in the wealth. Under certain circumstances, then, the 1,000 ha-offer might 
have worked. But with no clear understanding of what was happening, anger toward the com-
pany grew stronger. 
V. THE WILMAR YEARS 
By the time the giant Wilmar Group acquired PT Asiatic in 2006, two new factors were at work. 
One was direct local elections, which came into effect in 2005 and in some cases made local 
officials more responsive to conflicts in their constituencies. Another was international advoca-
cy for sustainable palm oil production. Around the world, palm oil companies were beginning 
to feel the impact of consumer protests against the environmental and social damage wrought 
by palm oil plantations. One result was the establishment in 2004 of the Roundtable on Sustain-
able Palm Oil (RSPO) bringing together growers, traders, manufacturers, investors and NGOs. 
Local politics and international advocacy both made themselves felt as the conflict entered a 
new phase.
Wilmar made it clear that the offer of land within the main concession area was now off the 
table. Instead PT Asiatic under the new management would make 1,000 ha available on the 
concession of PT Maju Perkasa Sawit and PT Jammer Tulen, the two smaller subsidiaries to the 
west. The company said it would help the communities establish a cooperative there, manage the 
production, and share the profits on a 50/50 basis.32 
A few of the SAD groups agreed, but SAD113 did not. The land proposed was nowhere near 
their customary land, and they would have had to share it with every other descent group ne-
gotiating with PT Asiatic, of which there were at least five. They were adamant that they wanted 
their full customary land returned. On 11 October 2006, they held a demonstration in front of 
the provincial land agency’s office in Jambi (BPN-Jambi), asking it to mediate their claims. They 
also turned to a new actor for help: PRD/STN. 
In response to a letter from STN in February 2007 about SAD113’s grievances against PT 
Asiatic, the land agency head authorised a research team to go to Jambi and investigate. When 
STN had difficulty getting access to the investigators’ report, it turned for help to the Indonesian 
National Human Rights Commission and increased advocacy efforts on behalf of the Jambi 
group more generally.33 
SAD113’s turn toward STN and BPN coincided with a brief flurry of interest by the Yudhoy-
ono administration in land reform, thanks to the man appointed to head the BPN, Joyo Winoto. 
Winoto, who took over the agency in 2005, had excellent relations in the agrarian activist com-
munity and put a high priority on distributive justice and resolving land conflicts. In January 
2007, President Yudhoyono announced a new land reform program that planned to redistrib-
ute millions of hectares of state land, including abandoned land and some 8.15 million ha of 
“convertible” forest, to the poor. The program eventually foundered as key ministries, especially 
Forestry, made known their objections and Yudhoyono himself backed down. 34 But for a while, 
just at the time Wilmar was taking over PT Asiatic, there was hope that for once, the landless, 
31 The fact that 241 ha of rubber trees belonging to SAD113 was not disturbed was an indication that these matters could have 
been worked out.
32 Colchester et al, p.26.
33 The report eventually surfaced. Dated 12 August 2007, “Laporan Hasil Penelitian Konflik Tanah Masuarakat Adat Orang 
Kubu Kelompok Padang Salak, Pinang Tinggi dan Tanah Menang Kecamatan Sungai Bahar Kabupaten Muaro Jambi 
Provinsi Jambi”, acknowledged SAD113’s claims and noted current land use but concluded by recommending that both 
sides find a mutually acceptable partnership program for palm oil production.
34 See Noer Fauzi Rachman, op. cit., Chapter 4.
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land-poor and dispossessed had a real ally in Jakarta. It was an ally, however, with no enforce-
ment capacity.
A. Mediation
By the time Wilmar came into the picture, some 30 separate groups were in conflict with PT 
Asiatic.35 Wilmar itself was already the focus of international attention from groups concerned 
about environmental damage, forced evictions and social conflicts associated with the palm 
oil industry. Because its investors included the International Finance Corporation (IFC), these 
groups could use a complaints mechanism set up by the IFC, the Office of the Compliance 
Advisory Ombudsman (CAO) to voice their concerns. In July 2007, nineteen groups filed a 
complaint with CAO about Wilmar’s operations in West Kalimantan that triggered a reasonably 
successful mediation process.36 
Hoping for the same, in October 2008 leaders from five different SAD groups, including 
SAD113, sent a complaint to Wilmar about PT Asiatic, with copies to the IFC and RSPO. In 
this case, CAO decided not to mediate the conflict itself but to support a local mediation effort 
by a respected local environmental NGO, Setara Jambi. Wilmar and PT Asiatic agreed, as did 
SAD113 and one smaller group led by a man named Mat Ukup.37 The 26-month negotiating 
process, frustrating for all involved, has been described at length from the mediator’s point of 
view.38 
The company stuck to its earlier proposal that both groups should take part in the partner-
ship program on the 1,000 ha offered earlier, which 771 other SAD families by this time had 
already accepted. It agreed, however, to enclave the SAD113 burial sites and later, the area of 
smallholder rubber cultivation. Eventually the Mat Ukup group agreed to move on to the 1,000 
ha, but SAD113, by this time representing some 1,359 people (not clear how many families), 
refused.39 In April 2010, it suggested that it would accept 1,000 ha just as compensation for the 
loss of its customary land, but it would have to be within the main concession area and only for 
the SAD113 members themselves.
As the negotiations proceeded, both sides agreed to a participative mapping project with a 
firm hired by the company, Daemeter Consulting, to document the various claims. The map 
produced by Daemeter in 2010 showed the SAD113 claim to be 3,461 ha, not too far off from the 
3,550 ha cited in the old 1987 document that the Forest Ministry had produced. PT Asiatic made 
clear, however, that it did not recognise Daemeter’s map as proof of the legitimacy of the claim.40 
Meanwhile, in June 2010 the company went ahead and set up a cooperative, called Sanak 
Mandiri, for the 1,000 ha in sections of the PT Jammer Tulen and PT Maju Perkasa Sawit con-
35 IPAC correspondence with Wilmar, 28 Makrch 2014.
36 See www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/IFCCAOletter18july.pdf. The organisations represented 
by the signatories included Forest Peoples Programmes; Friends of the Earth (Netherlands); Sawit Watch; Lembaga Ge-
mawan; KONTAK Rakyat Borneo; HuMa; ELSAM; SPKS; Save Our Boreno; PADI; Oxfam; Both ENDS; Environment 
Defense; Down to Earth; Hakiki Foundation; CAPPA; Setara Jambi; Walhi; and Ugandese National Association of Profeså-
different operations where there were disputes, and the third was specifically about PT Asiatic after forcible evictions and 
bulldozing of homes in 2011.
37 Colchester et al, p.20. Initially, the talks, which began on 17 February 2009, involved five SAD groups,named after either 
their own organization, an ancestor or a founding member. The five were PERMASAD; FORKALASAD/FORMASKU; 
SAD113; Mat Ukup; Datuk Dahlan; Kelompok SK Bupati Batang Hari 2003. The Mat Ukup group consisted of 104 families.
38 “Mediation: a strategy or a final objective?” op.cit.
39 The figure 1,359 comes from Daemeter Consulting, an independent consulting firm based in Bogor, Indonesia that PT 
Asiatic hired in 2009 to do a social impact assessment for th e concession area. One of its tasks included trying to establish 
whether the claimants were in fact indigenous. No one has a clear idea how many households the 1,359 figure represents.
40 See Colchester et al, p.24.
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cessions , despite questions over the status of the land.41 
In April 2011, after several further rounds of talks with PT Asiatic produced no progress on 
getting land inside the main concession area, SAD113 leaders pulled out of the mediated talks. 
The breakdown produced a rift among the NGOs in Jambi, with those like Setara that had fa-
voured negotiation being seen as too compromising by the more ideologically-based peasant 
unions to whom some of the disappointed SAD groups were now turning. It also increased the 
competition among them. One NGO leader said every time he developed a program for one 
group of farmers, he would find that one of the peasant unions started new organizing efforts in 
the same area.42
B. A Second Round of Negotiations
In August 2011, an incident of unauthorised palm oil harvesting triggered a security operation 
that led to the eviction of 83 families in the southern part of the concession and the destruction 
of their homes. This led to another complaint to the CAO in November 2011 and to a new round 
of negotiations with Wilmar.43 Five farmers’ groups took part, including the evicted families, all 
of which received compensation for their losses.44 One of the groups was a splinter of SAD113 
from Dusun Lamo, Pinang Tinggi, led by a man named Pak Nurman, who had taken part in the 
first round of talks and was willing to give mediation a second chance.
This time, however, on behalf of 200 households, he decided to press for the return of 1,029 
ha within the broader SAD113 ha claim, causing some friction with the other claimants. He 
used an important document as evidence: the missing map from the 1987 inventory. The Forest-
ry Ministry had finally produced it after a CAO request and Dusun Lamo was clearly marked.45 
 The company argued that it had paid compensation for 610 ha of the Dusun Lamo land when 
it was first acquired. It agreed to pay rent of Rp.150,000 per month from now until the end of the 
concession period for another 258 ha for which it had no record of having paid anything. The 
rest of the Dusun Lamo land, according to Wilmar, was being occupied by another group, and 
Pak Nurman would have to resolve the competing claim before PT Asiatic could do anything 
further.46 Pak Nurman said he first wanted the company to produce a list of who received the 
compensation, because it could well have been paid to people who had no rights to it.47
Four rounds of negotiation produced no satisfactory results and in October 2012, Wilmar 
and the Dusun Lamo group agreed that the only way to decide the claim was through the courts. 
Negotiations between the company and other groups, however, continued.
C. Mass Action
Meanwhile, the rest of SAD113 was pursuing a completely separate strategy. Beginning in late 
41 PT Maju Perkasa Sawit never obtained a location permit and PT Jammer Tulen’s permit ended in 2007 when the district 
head of Batang Hari refused to extend it.
42 IPAC interview, NGO leader, Jambi, February 2014.
43 For a copy of the formal complaint to Wilmar, see www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=177. 
44 The five were the evicted families from Jambatan Besi, Sungai Buaian Ilir; and Danau Minang; KOPSAD/PERSADA; the 
Sungai Beruang group led by Pak Roni; the Terawang Group; and an SAD113 group from Dusun Lamo, Pinang Tinggi. 
Originally the Mat Ukup group was going to take part, but the representative who came did not get the required letter of 
authorisation from the group and was dropped from the process. IPAC correspondence with Wilmar representative, 28 
March 2014. A detailed record of this round of negotiations can be found in “Mediation: a strategy or a final objective?” 
op.cit., pp.31-33.
45 It also showed 50 ha in the Penyerukan area, much further south, so technically SAD113 should have been campaigning 
for 3,500 ha, not 3,550 ha but under the circumstances, this was a quibble.
46 IPAC correspondence with Wilmar, 28 March 2014. The figure cited in the correspondence was 601 ha but other sources 
say 610 and we think this was a typo.
47 “Mediation: a strategy or a final objective?” op.cit.
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2011, most of the SAD113 leaders threw in their lot with PRD/STN, turning to demonstrations, 
occupations and other forms of mass action. Along the way, their own very specific agenda of 
recovering one specific swathe of ancestral land became subsumed in STN’s broader goals of 
agrarian reform and political party-building. STN activists understood very well the political 
power of television; getting coverage on Indonesian news channels, from which the vast major-
ity of Indonesians get their news, was worth more than any amount of quiet lobbying. Numbers 
mattered, so did drama, and the drama often came from a narrative of violence. Arrests, forced 
evictions, and shootings reinforced the narrative of the victimised poor and could be parlayed 
into a push to change laws or a commitment of bureaucrats to cut through red tape. It was there-
fore in PRD/STN’s interests to meld a range of different stories into one, so that there was always 
some part of the crowd that had been evicted or arrested. Many of its actions therefore involved 
a range of different groups, sometimes blurring the lines between them. The participants often 
had to put up their own money to join these STN-organised actions, but the payoff was poten-
tially high.
1. STN’s Broader Goals
STN also had another objective. This was to help build up a political base so that PRD, its par-
ent organisation, would be able to contest the 2019 elections.48 At its seventh party congress in 
March 2010, party leaders had decided to move from being a cadre-based party to a mass-based 
one. 
We learned that to become an alternative political force, we couldn’t just shout that we 
were an alternative; we had to have people’s organisations working from the bottom up 
over the long-term. We came to understand that our struggle required “revolutionary 
patience”...49
They also took several other important decisions at the seventh congress that would have 
direct implications for Jambi:
• They decided to make Pancasila the ideological base of the party rather than “people’s so-
cial democracy” to “remove the stigma of Communism” that had been attached to PRD.50 
• They concluded that “neo-liberalism”, defined as “a social system based on control of 
economic resources by big capital, mostly foreign-owned”, had become the new source of 
social injustice in post-authoritarian Indonesia.
• They shifted away from a focus on “proletarianism” to a strategy that would embrace 
dispossessed farmers as well as workers.51 This became the “Article 33 Movement”, a cam-
paign to enforce Article 33 of the Indonesian constitution, particularly its third clause: 
“The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the powers of the 
State and shall be used to the benefit of the people.” 
For all of this, land conflicts became a critical entry point for organising, and Sumatra, with 
the dramatic expansion of agribusiness, particularly palm oil, held particular promise. 
48 IPAC interview, Agus Jabo, Jakarta, 16 February 2013.
49 “15 Tahun Perjalanan PRD”, 22 July 2011, available at www.berdikarionline.com/editorial/20110722/15-tahun-perjala-
nan-prd.html.
50 “Laporan Dari Kongres VII PRD: Titik Balik Dalam 14 Tahun Perjalanan Partai”, available at kabarrakyatindonesia.blog-
spot.com, 16 July 2010.
51 Ibid.
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2. Jambi Farmers Go to Jakarta
In early December 2011, several dozen Jambi farmers left for Jakarta under PRD/STN auspices. 
They included several in conflict with PT Asiatic, including SAD113 leaders, as well as members 
of two unrelated groups from neighbouring concessions, mostly migrants, that were trying to 
secure a community forest program.52 
On 8 December, they sat in front of the Indonesian parliament for a few days to demand 
revocation of an amended forestry law, until PRD/STN’s failure to make arrangements for food, 
tents or toilets led to its dispersal. On 15 December, they demanded and secured a meeting with 
a senior Forestry Ministry official where the focus was on the community forest program. On 20 
December, they moved to BPN to press SAD113 concerns.53 There, in a meeting with the direc-
tor for land conflicts, they were able to secure an agreement in principle for the return of the full 
3,000-plus ha of customary land.54 Armed with this assurance, they jubilantly returned to Jambi. 
On 26 March 2012, thanks to PRD/STN lobbying, a critical meeting took place in the Jambi 
governor’s office. In attendance were the Director of Land Conflict from the central office of 
BPN, members of the provincial legislature, adat leaders, and representatives of the Batang Hari 
district government. All present agreed that PT Asiatic had an obligation to enclave the 3,550 
ha, effectively taking it out of the concession. This was an extraordinary triumph, but there was 
a catch. The enclaving had to be preceded by a re-measuring process to mark off the bound-
aries. This was to be completed in two months, at the company’s expense. Meanwhile, the dis-
trict government would undertake a verification process to determine who among the SAD113 
claimants could in fact make a legitimate claim to indigenous status; only the “real” SAD would 
be entitled to the land.55 A few months later, the district verification team announced that 936 
people had been “verified”.56
As the head of PRD said later, “We won!”57 This was what SAD113 had been waiting for: a de-
finitive government recognition of their claim. But while the 26 March meeting was undeniably 
a victory, it quickly became clear that no one could compel the company to go along. 
In the meantime, tensions rose as SAD113 members occupied part of the concession area 
they claimed and with PRD/STN’s encouragement, began harvesting oil palm fruits. As far as 
PT Asiatic was concerned, this was theft; according to the farmers, the fruit was rightfully theirs 
because it was their land that had been stolen. On 27 April, police arrested Mawardi, the PRD 
coordinator for Jambi, and charged him with masterminding the stealing. He was released two 
days later. 
On 7 May 2012, however, the Batang Hari government ordered the SAD113 members to 
52 These were farmers from Mekar Jaya and Kunangan Jaya II who were trying to get approval for the enclaving of 3,482 ha 
and 8,000 ha respectively land for the program known as Hutan Tanaman Rakyat. The land in question fell within the 
concession areas of PT Agronusa Alam Sejahtera; PT Wanakasita Nusantara; and PT Restorasi Ekosistem Indonesia (PT 
REKI).
53 “Menhut Setujui Tuntutan Petani Jambi”, Berdikari Online, 17 December 2011. Berdikari Online is the STN website.
54 “BPN Setujui Tuntutan Suku Anak Dalam 113 Jambi”, Berdikari Online, 21 December 2011. Since the 1987 map had been 
discovered, the group had raised their claim from the 3,461 on the Daemeter map to the 3,550 on the earlier map.
55 “Kesepakatan Rapat Koordinasi Penyelesaian Permasalahan PT Asiatic Persada Dengan Masyarakat SAD,”26 March 2012. 
Notes of the meeting were signed by those present: Syharasaddin, provincial secretary; Ronsen Pasaribu, director for Land 
Conflict of BPN; H.Hasan Ibrahim, head of Commission II in the Jambi provincial legislature; H. Azra’i Al-Basyari, head 
of Lembaga Adat Melayu, Jambi; Yazirman, Sekda Batang Hari; Kailani, Asisten I Sekda Jambi; H. Haviz Husaini, Asisten 
II, Sekda Jambi; Anyawangung K. Janguk, head of Kanwil BPN Jambi; H. Tagor Mulia Nasution, head of Dinas Perkebunan 
Jambi; H. Sepdinal, head of Exbang; Abu Nandim, Intelkam Polda Jambi and Sri Novriyana, BPN Batang Hari.
56 “Keputusan Bupat Batang Hari No 347 2012 tentang Penetapan Hasil Identifikasi dan Verifikasi Nama-nama Suku Anak 
Dalam (SAD) Kelompok KOPSAD, Kelompok 113, Kelompok Pompa Air, Kelompok Bungku, Kelompok Herman Basir, 
Kelompok Harun MD dan Kelompok Lain-lain yang berada dalam Areal HGU PT Asiatic Persada”, 28 May 2012. The an-
nouncement was accompanied by a list of names of “candidates to receive palm oil plantations through the KKPA Program 
of PT Asiatic Persada”. Since virtually everyone on the list is married, the names effectively represent families.
57 IPAC interview, Agus Jabo, 14 February 2014.
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vacate the area.58 The government cited an odd legal source: a presidential decree from 1960 
forbidding the use of land without the permission of those who have rights or control over it 
and giving the local government the right to clear it of those without such rights.59 The SAD113 
community, backed by PRD/STN, came back with a response demanding that the Batang Hari 
government acknowledge its rights to the enclave of 3,550 ha.60 
When nothing happened, PRD/STN went back to Jakarta and asked KOMNAS-HAM for 
help in getting the promised re-measuring on track so that the process of setting up the enclave 
could begin. At a meeting in the KOMNAS office on 10 July 2012, BPN, PT Asiatic, PRD and 
district and government officials agreed that the process would start no later than two months 
after PT Asiatic turned over the requisite funds to BPN.61 On 1 August, back in Jambi, the same 
parties, with a few additions, reconvened at the governor’s office and added some details to the 
re-measuring plans.62 But still no funds were forthcoming.
As months went by without any progress, STN stepped up mass action. In November it took a 
group of farmers to Jakarta to set up tents in front of the Indonesian parliament -- and again the 
SAD113 story was blended into the community forest campaign as a general push for justice for 
Jambi’s poor.63 No one in the Jakarta media was particularly interested in getting straight which 
group wanted what, and in any case, it did not matter. Much more important was on the second 
day of the protest, television cameras captured images of security guards at the parliament pull-
ing down the tents, getting STN just what it wanted – more publicity.
On 12 December 2012, a group of 33 farmers started a “Long March”, walking from Jambi 
to Jakarta, with delegates from several different conflicts including SAD113. It was a PRD/STN 
stunt to attract political attention. Along the way, it picked up a few marchers from Mesuji, Lam-
pung where another major land conflict was brewing in which STN was not very successfully 
trying to play a role; PRD/STN branches elsewhere held demonstrations in solidarity.64 PRD’s 
efforts to drum up widespread public support through social media, however, fell flat – the 
“Movement of Support of 10,000 Facebookers for the Long March of the Jambi Farmers” got 
only a modest 483 “likes”.65 
After more than a month, the marchers arrived in Jakarta on 22 January 2013 where they 
were welcomed by PRD’s labor organisation, Kongres Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia (KASBI). 
After a few days’ rest, PRD/STN organised a rally in front of the presidential palace before mov-
ing on to the Forestry Ministry where the farmers set up tents and proceeded to live there for 
the next two and a half months. 
Throughout this period, there was no movement from PT Asiatic on providing funds for the 
re-measurement. On 14 January, the provincial BPN office sent it a gentle reminder but got no 
58 “Mediation: a strategy or a final objective?” op.cit., p.31.
59 Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Undang No.51 Tahun 1960 tentang: Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Ijin Yang 
Berhak Atau Kuasanya. Article 2 states that it is forbidden to use land with the permission of those who are legally entitled 
to it (berhak atau kuasanya yang sah). See bppt.jabarprov.go.id/assets/data/arsip/9_PERPU_No_51_Tahun_1960.pdf.
60 Statement of Abas Subuk, 15 May 2012, “Pernyataan Sikap Suku Anak Dalam 113 Kepada Pemda Batang Hari dan CAO.”
61 KOMNAS-HAM, “Berita Acara Mediasi Sengketa Lahan Antara Warga Masyarakat Suku Anak Dalam 113 dengan PT 
Asiatic Persada”. According to these notes, the company was obliged to put up these funds in accordance with a government 
regulation (PP No.13 Th 2010 tentang Jenis dan Tarif atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak).
62 “Kesepakatan Rapat Bersama”, Kantor Gubernur Provinsi Jambi, 1 August 2012. This time it was agreed the entire con-
cession area would have to be re-measured. Strangely, a local NGO, Peduli Bangsa, would be responsible for the costs of 
measuring the 20,000 boundaries of the concession, while PT Asiatic would have to pay for the measuring of the 3, 550 ha 
enclave.
63 One television station covered the story as the demand of SAD farmers for an enclave from the Forestry Ministry, neatly 
but erroneously tying the two threads together. See “Barang dirampas Pamdal DPR, Petani Jambi Protes,” liputan6.com, 19 
November 2012.
64 See “Mesuji: Anatomy of An Indonesian Land Conflict”, IPAC Report No.1, August 2013.
65 See www.facebook.com/pages/Gerakan-10-Ribu-Fesbukers-Dukung-Aksi-Long-March-1000-Km-Petani-Jambi/178515988958279. 
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response.66 
Then in April 2013, without any warning, Wilmar sold its shares in PT Asiatic to PT Agro 
Mandiri Semesta (PT AMS) of the Ganda Group, another conglomerate that was a Wilmar sup-
plier and whose CEO was the brother of Wilmar’s founder. It apparently had had enough of the 
constant battling:
After much deliberation, we decided to sell PT Asiatic due to the difficult social conditions 
there, which led to an untenable situation for the Group.67 
The decision pushed Pak Nurman, the most committed supporter of mediation, into the arms 
of PRD/STN.
VI.  THE “TEMPORARY SOLUTION” OF 2,000 HECTARES
The sale to PT AMS changed dynamics in three fundamental ways. It shifted the locus for find-
ing a solution to the district level, away from the province or center and it led to a push for a 
one-size-fits-all solution. Over time, it also undercut the PRD/STN strategy. 
The shift to the district coincided with the setting up of “integrated teams” (tim terpadu or 
timdu) to address internal security issues, the direct result of a series of implementing instruc-
tions derived from a 2012 law on handling social conflicts.68 In March 2013, the Batang Hari 
district government established its own team that from then on took the lead in “solving” the 
various conflicts with PT Asiatic. Whatever discussions STN was having in Jakarta and no mat-
ter how sympathetic various officials in the province government might be, it was henceforth 
the district team -- whose officials tended to be closer to the company – that had the lead role.69
The one-size solution involved a move to offer everyone verified as a SAD claimant a two-ha 
plot on 2,000 ha on the old PT Jammer Tulen concession. It was clear that the new owners want-
ed a resolution of all of these conflicts, but like Wilmar, they preferred that the claimants move 
off the main concession. This may have been one of the reasons the company failed to respond 
to further letters from the provincial government, reminding it of its obligations to fund the 
re-measuring – it was buying time to prepare for a very different solution.70 The coming elec-
tions in April 2014 provided a convenient deadline to secure agreement.
As the company’s offer of the 2,000 ha was refined, the district team increased pressure on the 
SAD families still occupying their old land to move. In October, an impatient PRD/STN held a 
demonstration in front of the governor’s office, demanding that the concession permit for PT 
Asiatic be revoked because of its failure to meet its obligations. The provincial secretary came 
out to meet the demonstrators and agreed to help – only, he said, it would be more polite to ask 
for “a review” of the permit rather than a revocation outright. He wrote to BPN accordingly, rec-
ommending the review, while at the same time sending a third reminder to the company about 
funding the re-measuring. But he also told the protestors that they should temporarily take up 
the company’s offer while the government tried to work out the recovery of the 3,550 ha.71
On 27 November, the district adat office held a discussion with the district government, the 
66 Surat BPN Provinsi Jambi No. 040/200/I/2013. 
67 IPAC correspondence with Wilmar, 28 March 2014.
68 Law No.7/2012 on Handling Social Conflict was followed by Presidential Instruction No 2/2013 on Handing Internal Se-
curity Disturbances in 2013, dated 28 January 2013. This in turn was followed by Decision of the Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Security and Legal Affairs No.12/2013 of 5 February 2013 to set up integrated teams.
69 The bupati headed the team but the police chief (polres) as second deputy head (wakil ketua II) who seemed to be in charge. 
The first deputy head was the district secretary; the third was the district military commander. See Keputusan Bupati 
Batang Hari Nomor 158, 6 March 2013.
70 A second reminder was sent on 7 May 2013.
71 IPAC interview with Syahrasaddin, provincial secretary, Jambi, 10 February 2014.
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SAD groups and the police. They agreed to set up yet another verification team to determine 
which descent groups (rumpun keturunan) had adat rights in the concession area of PT Asiatic 
Persada and thus who would be eligible for land in the 2,000 ha.72 They also rejected aany coop-
eration with the cooperative Sanak Mandiri and stated that they did not recognise the position 
of temenggung, traditionally the highest lawgiver in the adat hierarchy.73 The last appears to have 
been a way of rejecting the authority of one adat leader in particular who was seen as too close to 
the company.74 (As Indonesia debates giving greater authority to adat leaders and adat councils, 
the question of who has the right to represent adat groups will arise with increasing frequency.)
On 1 December 2013, a flyer was circulated signed by 30 adat leaders. It said an agreement 
had been reached with the company and that all those occupying homes or land in the main 
concession area should leave. Every SAD household with outstanding claims against PT Asiatic 
would be given two ha and a house, inside the 2,000 ha of the PT Jammer Tulen concession. 
Those who had not yet established households would be guaranteed jobs on the plantation and 
live in company barracks.75 
The district government, meanwhile, said there was no choice. If SAD113 families did not 
want to move, they would be evicted. On 7 December 2013, after three ignored warnings to 
move, a joint team of Brimob, TNI and company security guards moved into the SAD113 occu-
pation sites destroying almost 300 homes over the next week.76 The destruction played directly 
into PRD/STN’s hands and prompted a new wave of mass action. It also helped shore up, at least 
temporarily, what seemed to be a weakening resolve among some of the SAD113 to keep the 
protests going.
A. More Mass Actions
On 10 December, STN brought over 100 SAD members to Jakarta to the National Human Rights 
Commission to protest their evictions and press their claims at the National Land Agency. The 
group included top SAD113 leaders, although as usual, the group was a hodgepodge represent-
ing different disputes and claims. All interviews with them were controlled by their PRD/STN 
handlers.77 After camping out for several weeks at the Commission, they eventually returned 
home, with little to show for the initiative. 
Perhaps hoping for more reaction in Jambi, PRD/STN organised hundreds of farmers to 
mass in front of the Jambi governor’s office on 24 December, demanding the return of the 3,550 
ha, the revocation of PT Asiatic’s concession, and – in a demand which had nothing to do with 
the SAD113 group -- the fulfilment of a promise from the Forestry Ministry to grant commu-
nity forest status (HTR) to farmers from two different concession areas. Again, the demonstra-
tors were a mixed lot, including some genuine SAD members but also including migrants who 
were brought in simply to provide extra bodies. The demonstrators camped on the governor’s 
grounds for more than a week, then moved to the provincial forestry office.
On 8 January 2014 a meeting took place of the social conflict teams of the province and 
the district together with representatives of different SAD groups, including SAD113. By this 
72 “Kronologi Perusakan dan Penggusuran Suku Anak Dalam.” Abunyani, an adat leader associated with SAD113, later dis-
puted that the 27 November entailed any acceptance of the 2,000 ha. See “Dianggap meresahan, Suku Anak Dalam Dipaksa 
Hengkang dan Pengungsian”, Mongabay website, 11 January 2014.
73 “Notulen Pertemuan, Pengurus Lembaga Adat Bumi Serentak Bak Regam dengan Suku Anak Dalam Wilayah” Bungku, 27 
November 2013.
74 The leader in question is Herman Basyir, who uses the titleTumenggung Sembilan Bilah, head of the SAD groups in the 
Bathin IX area. His father, Datuk Maliki, held the position before him.
75 IPAC interview with Syahrasaddin, provincial secretary, Jambi. 10 February 2014.
76 These included 31 in Padang Salak, six in Terawang, 109 in Pinang Tinggi and 150 in Tanah Menang.
77 “Tujuh Alasan Penggusuran PT. Asiatic Persada Terhadap SAD Dianggap Ilegal”, Berdikari Online, 11 December 2013.
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time, fourteen groups representing 649 families or 2,049 individuals had been verified as SAD 
and were registered to receive land on the 2,000 ha.78 The teams told SAD113 leaders that they 
should move on to the 2,000 ha while waiting for the larger issue to be resolved, repeatedly 
stressing that it was a temporary solution.79 They also gave the protesters three days to leave 
government premises; it was clear their patience was waning. As a result of the ultimatum, STN 
simply moved its followers into the provincial adat house nearby.
On 16 January, the Batang Hari district government issued another warning: the SAD113 
families would have to move off PT Asiatic’s concession area entirely. The government had made 
land available on the 2000 ha, contingent on a verification process. If they chose not to take ad-
vantage of it, they would be evicted. Still, the SAD113 leaders refused. 
By this time, national elections were only months away, and other NGOs were convinced that 
there was an element of grandstanding involved, especially because the local PRD coordinator, 
Mawardi, was a standing as a candidate for the provincial assembly from the National Mandate 
Party, PAN.80 A few local legislators, including one from the Gerindra party, were also interest-
ed in being seen to champion the SAD cause. Some even suggested that the reason the STN/
PRD clients were camped out at the adat house was not unrelated to the fact that Camelia Piji 
Astuti, the daughter of the provincial adat leader, was running for the national parliament from 
the Demokrat Party. The family’s support of the adat struggle, it was suggested, could bring in 
votes.81 (As this report went to press, it was unclear whether any of these candidates was suc-
cessful.)
But the SAD113 demand was straightforward and non-negotiable: re-measure the land as 
promised, and then we can talk. A delegation from the National Human Rights Commission 
came to see the protestors at the adat house. The meeting produced a statement on 23 January 
that the conflict with PT Asiatic must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue; that all par-
ties should respect the results of mediation to be conducted by the national BPN; and that the 
SAD groups had a right to be protected from violence, evictions, arrests, intimidation and other 
forms of “militaristic hooliganism”. It demanded that those occupying the 3,550 ha be given a 
right to stay on the land through the duration of the mediation process and promised that SAD 
Jambi would not use violence or vandalise company facilities and would not take any palm fruit 
“outside the area of their customary land and the areas they were cultivating.”82 
On 3 February, PRD/STN issued a statement that their SAD clients were refusing the govern-
ment’s order to move for several reasons, among them:
• The land in the ex PT Jammer Tulen concession was only being made available as a part-
nership, and SAD had rejected this in 2010;
78 STN claimed that as a result of the evictions, twelve of the fourteen had revoked their commitment to the 2,000 ha partner-
ship program; from IPAC interviews, with several group leaders, this was not accurate.
79 “Areal yang 2.000 ha hanya untuk penghidupan sementara menjelang areal 3.550 ha dapat diselesaikan,” Pemerintah 
Provinsi Jambi Sekretariat Daerah, Notulen Rapat, 8 January 2014.
80 There was no particular rationale to choosing PAN. PRD’s aim was to get as many of its officials as possible accepted as can-
didates by mainstream parties because it was too small to field candidates itself. Any party would do, both so that members 
could represent pro-poor views in local legislatures but also so they could build the base for 2019 from inside the system. 
PRD leaders claimed that its members did not have to put up any money to become candidates, as is the usual practice, 
but that it was the other way around: parties were courting them, because of their perceived mass base among farmers in 
certain areas. Interview Agus Jabo, 14 February 2014, Jakarta.
81 IPAC interview, Jambi, 6 February 2014.
82 “Pernyataan Bersama”, 23 January 2014 signed by Dianto Bachriadi, KOMNAS HAM; A.R. Syahbandar, member of the 
Jambi provincial legislature; H. Hasip Kalimuddin Syam, Melayu Adat Institute, Jambi; Drs. H. Azrai Albasari, secre-
tary-general of the Melayu Adat Institute Sumatra; Kutar, SAD Bathin Bahar; Agrus Pranata, STN Jambi; Ahmad Ramli, 
Laskar Melayu Jambi; and Feri Irawan, Perkumpulan Hijau (NGO). Laskar Melayu Jambi was formed in February 2012 
to defend Melayu culture in Jambi from foreign elements. Its biggest issue to date has been its efforts to return an island, 
Pulau Berhala, to Jambi. In February 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was part of neighboring Riau Archipelago 
province.
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• It was not an adequate substitute for the 3,550 ha;
• It lay outside the boundaries of their customary land and in any case was of uncertain legal 
status, since the permit of the two companies had lapsed in 2005; and
• It would create new conflict with existing farmers there who had worked the land since 
the 1970s.
PRD/STN argued that thousands of SAD farmers had been forcibly evicted and denied 
protection from the government whereas the company was protected by law even though it 
engaged in violence, shootings, house burnings, forced evictions and the like. The farmers, it 
said, were the ones criminalised to force them to kowtow to the interests of capitalists. The state-
ment concluded with four demands: revoke PT Asiatic’s permit or return the customary land as 
an enclave, in accordance with the Letter of Recommendation of October 2013; end the insis-
tence on a partnership; stop the Batang Hari government’s practice of one-sided mediation; and 
give guarantees of protection to the SAD farmers to return to their original hamlets in Tanah 
Menang, Pinang Tinggi, and Padang Salak.83
On 20 February, STN tried to organise a return of the SAD113 – or what they called SAD113 
but in fact included many others -- to the area where the forced evictions had taken place in De-
cember. They were met by a phalanx of police in full riot gear.84 Hundreds massed at the district 
adat office, but when they were asked for proof of their SAD status, they melted away. District 
adat officials are convinced that most in the crowd were migrants.85
B. Land Allocation
Meanwhile, the company and district government were allocating land for those who had agreed 
to the company’s offer. The new verification process was extended until the end of February 2014, 
to allow more groups to sign up. By the time the deadline passed, seventeen separate descent 
groups comprising more than 1,000 families had agreed to move on to the 2,000 ha, including 
many in the SAD113 group who were growing weary of the endless protests and demands for 
contributions without anything to show for it. Because of the publicity surrounding the group, 
these “defectors” were asked to sign statements specifically stating that they had left the SAD113 
group of their own free will and had accepted the arrangements with the company.86
By early March 2014, the company and the district government had mapped out the land 
allotments to each descent group, so that each family had a two-ha plot of oil palm to cultivate, 
with the boundaries clearly mapped and metal plaques put up on trees accordingly. While the 
company had initially offered a “partnership”, it was publicly referring to the arrangements with 
the groups as “smallholdings” (plasma), which gave greater flexibility to the farmers. Each group 
was trying to work its own MOU with the company that would set out respective rights and re-
sponsibilities. The company had set aside 24 ha for housing and other facilities in addition to the 
two-ha plots. It also acknowledged that the 2000 ha included 500 ha that were still “not cleaned 
up” (tidak bersih), i.e. still occupied by other farmers.
As of March 2014, there were four categories of claimants in various relationships with PT 
Asiatic. They included:
• Those who accepted the offer of land on the 2,000 ha and were in the process of working 
83 “Pernyataan Sikap: Laksanakan UUPOA No 5/1960, Perlindungan untuk Rakyat, Bukan untuk Penusaha!”, Sekretariat 
Bersama Gerakan Nasional Pasal 33 UUD 1945 Propinsi Jambi, 3 February 2014. They also mentioned returning to Bukit 
Terawang.
84  “Warga SAD Dihadang Barikade Polisi di Batang Hari”, Harian Jambi, 21 February 2014.
85  IPAC interview, Lembaga Adat Bumi Serentak Bak Regam, Batang Hari, 9 March 2014.
86  IPAC Interview, Pak Syamsul, Lembaga Adat Bumi Serentak Bak Regam, Batang Hari, 10 March 2014.
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out terms of production with the company;
• Those like SAD113 who rejected the company’s offer and had joined forces with PRD/STN 
to continue to work for recovery of land within the main concession area;
• Those who rejected the offer and were occupying land within the 2,000 ha; and
• Those who had worked out separate arrangements with the company within the main 
concession area.
1. Pasirah Pintang Iman: An Acceptor
One group in the first category comes from a hamlet, Penyerukan, to the south of the SAD113 
villages.87 Called “Pasirah Pintang Iman”, after an ancestor, the group consists of 41 families 
totalling 144 people whose customary land lies partly in the PT Asiatic concession area and 
partly in a neighboring one. All 41 families went through the verification process.88 Once the 
verification of all families was completed at the end of February and plots allocated and marked 
by the district land office, the families were allowed to move there, some living in tents, others 
occupying housing that had been constructed in 2003 by the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation. Some 30 of the 41 families had moved by early March and had begun the enor-
mous task of cleaning up a plantation that had been largely untended for the last five years, 
clearing the secondary growth. Most of the farmers had eked out a living over the previous ten 
years scavenging loose fruit from the ground and selling it back to the company for a fraction 
of the market price, as well as searching in nearby forests for damar, a kind of resin, and rattan.
The number of ha allotted to each descent group is based on a calculation of two ha per 
family, with the adat leaders responsible for distribution within the group. Palm fruit is also 
weighed and purchased through the group, rather than through individual farmers. Pasirah 
Pintang Iman, like other descent groups, is setting up a cooperative for members but is insisting 
on control over inputs like fertiliser, so as not to be dependent on the company. 
Under the MOU being negotiated, the company would provide housing and schooling up 
to high school level, as well as clean water and other facilities. It would buy the palm fruit and 
arrange transport to the processing plant; the group already had its first receipts. 
The danger for the farmers, which they were well aware of, was that nothing was yet fully 
legal. The MOU was still being negotiated and it would have to be checked against all the exist-
ing laws that governed the land in question. All major players, however, considered as largely 
irrelevant the fact that the land was no longer PT Asiatic’s to give away; the provincial govern-
ment had the authority to take over abandoned land and this in itself would make the allocations 
legitimate.89 It was not an ideal arrangement, and it was not a substitute for the land they had 
lost. But with a guarantee of two ha per family, the farmers had decided that it was as good as 
they were likely to get.
87  Fifty ha of residential land in Penyerukan appear on the 1987 map that has become the basis of the SAD113 claim. This 
suggests that the SAD113 land is actually 3,500 ha.
88  The process was as follows: each household head went to the Lembaga Adat Batang Hari, the district adat office, capital, 
with his identification card and those of his family members as well as his marriage certificate. (The adat head insisted there 
were no women-headed households in the group, although the list of names suggests otherwise. Where the descent line 
went through the female line – for example, when a woman with verifiable adat descent had married a migrant – this was 
duly noted on the form, but her husband was still considered household head.) Where available, members brought proofs 
of descent. All these materials were entered into a database at the adat house, together with photographs of each couple 
verified. The household head then had to swear two oaths that he was telling the truth, once on the Qur’an and once on an 
adat symbol. 
89  Interview with with deputy head, Lembaga Adat Bumi Serentak Bak Regam, Batang Hari, Muara Bulian, 9 March 2014.
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2. Mustar from KOPSAD: A Rejector
The KOPSAD group was the one that had given up its 5,100 ha for the promise, never realised, 
of 600 ha in the main concession area. As noted earlier, the claim was bounced back and forth 
between the districts of Batang Hari and Muaro Jambi. In 2009, the Batang Hari district govern-
ment formally sent it back to Muaro Jambi. In 2010, a new round of meetings took place with 
district and provincial officials, all to no avail. 
Then, when Wilmar in 2010 offered to make 1,000 ha available in the PT Jammer Tulen con-
cession area to farmers with unresolved adat claims, one part of the KOPSAD group under its 
leader, Pak Mustar, was initially interested, if only because he was so discouraged at ever getting 
the 600 ha that they had been promised. He and 30 other families moved on to the site, but after 
three months, they were chased out by others already there. It is not clear why, but Pak Mustar 
had worked for five years for PT Asiatic’s security division, and he acknowledged that this could 
have been a factor.
The upshot of his rejection from the new site was that he threw his lot in with PRD/STN, 
although his son still works for PT Asiatic. When the Batang Hari government announced the 
new process of verification, his members had little interest in taking part, feeling that sooner or 
later, it would be another means to cheat them.90 
3. Ardani and the Team of 6: Occupiers of PT Jammer Tulen
In 2007 and 2008, as tensions with Wilmar were rising, an SAD leader from Bungku village 
named Ardani led a group of some 2,000 farmers variously known LSM Formasku and Forum 
Komunikasi Lintas Adat –Suku Anak Dalam (Forkala-SAD) to occupy an area in the conces-
sion area of PT Jammer Tulen and PT Maju Perkasa Sawit. From the beginning, Ardani rejected 
negotiations with Wilmar, and argued that his group had a right to 5,000 ha of the land they 
were already cultivating, as well as 2,150 additional ha that had been their customary land and 
continuously cultivated from Dutch times.91
Over a period of two years, he and five others, collectively known as Team of 6, systematically 
collected money from other farmers, both SAD and migrant, on the understanding that all the 
funds were going toward recovery of this land, and that two ha-plots would be made available 
to each family that contributed.92 The sums were not small: the average collection per household 
was Rp.5 million, roughly US$500, for a total take between 2005 and 2007 of Rp.1.6 billion or 
$150,000. Each of the families who paid for land was given a temporary land certificate (surat 
tanah sporadik) signed by the then village head (another member of the Team of 6), with the 
understanding that this would be converted into a more permanent certificate later. The funds 
were also used to pay for the frequent trips to Jakarta by Ardani and other Team of 6 leaders to 
consult with lawyers.
Police accused Ardani of organising the systematic harvesting of oil palm on the land his 
group was occupying, and his members were frequently arrested for theft, on the basis of reports 
from PT Asiatic. But after sixteen of his men were arrested in July 2010, he argued that because 
the concessions of PT Jammer Tulen and PT MTS expired in 2005 and were not renewed, the 
land should have reverted to the state; PT Asiatic had no claim to it, so the men in question 
90 IPAC interview with Pak Mustar, Muara Penyerukan, 10 March 2014.
91 Surat Kuasa in the name of Ardani, Sukiwa, A Budi Gunawan, Rasto, Anton and Isnen, arranged by LBH Kris, Jakarta, 14 
January 2008.
92 “Buku Kas Penerimaan dari Donatur Mulai Tahun 2005 Bantuan Dana Perjuangan Masyarakat Desa Bungku, Kec Ba-
jubang, Batang Hari,” copy of handwritten list dated October 2007 and “Daftar Nama Donatur Perjuangan yang akan 
diberikan lahan kebun sawit seluas 2 Ha/KK dari Pengembalian Lahan Kebun Aswit Seluas 2,150 Ha yang ditanami oleh 
PTBDU, PT MPS dan PT Jamer Tulen Periode II LSM Formasku dan DI Era Tim 6 Desa Bungku”, 5 February 2008.
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could not be accused of theft. They were all acquitted.93
When local officials refer to parts of the 2,000 ha offered by PT Asiatic not being “clean” because 
it is already occupied, they are usually referring to Ardani’s group.
C. Conflict Resolved?
By March 2014, then, the balance of local political support seemed to have swung away from 
the SAD113 group and toward the acceptors. On 14 March, eager to remove all possible signs 
of conflict before the 9 April elections, the district government issued an announcement that 
all families who had gone through the verification process were asked to immediately occupy 
the land they had been given. Those who were not SAD were asked to voluntarily leave the 
concession area within 24 hours; and if they did not, security measures would be taken “in ac-
cordance with existing laws”. On 16 March, a major operation involving police, military and se-
curity guards entered Tanah Menang where hundreds of SAD113 protestors were living in tents. 
Videos show a fairly systematic and orderly process of uniformed police taking down tents and 
putting them on trucks. The STN headline, however was “Sadistic! Malaysian Company Uses 
Security Forces and Thugs to Attack Suku Anak Dalam!”.
On 21 March, the local newspaper announced in banner headlines “The Conflict with PT 
Asiatic is Over!”94 Herman Basir, the adat leader, announced that all SAD members had accept-
ed the smallholding arrangement with the company, and if anyone did not agree, it meant they 
were not really SAD. He said families were now receiving an income of about Rp1.6 million 
($160) a week and that everyone should be grateful to the company. 95
But the conflict is not over. Not only will SAD113 leaders continue to pursue the claim of the 
3,550 ha, but the seeds of a different kind of conflict have been sown, this time between locals 
and migrants.
VII. MIGRANTS, LAND SALES AND OIL PALM “THEFT”
The narrative of the dispossessed indigenous farmer vs the evil company is complicated by the 
issues of illegal sales of land and palm oil. Both are big businesses, both are encouraging more 
migrants to come into the area, and in both, the migrants more often than not end up as victim. 
Both are used to raise funds for the “struggle” but it is not at all clear where the money actually 
goes. PRD/STN officials deny direct role in either, but see nothing wrong in SAD members har-
vesting palm trees planted by PT Asiatic on land taken from them in the 1980s. The problem is 
that the pickers sometimes rob other SAD members as well. The scale is huge: from January to 
June 2012, PT Asiatic claims it lost 33,000 metric tonnes of oil palm fruits to theft.
A. Land Sales
From the outset of the conflict, certain SAD leaders have acquired funds by selling plots of land 
on the PT Asiatic concession area to outsiders, either on spec, allegedly in the expectation that 
their customary land will be recovered, or through de facto control of land, as with Ardani, 
above. 
Either way, in the eyes of both adat and Indonesian law, these sales are illegal because the 
individuals sellers do not have title to the land in question. In Ardani’s case, the sales were au-
93 “Dituduh Mencari Sawit, Hamid dkk dituntut 1 tahun penjara,” Elsam.or.id, January 2011.
94 “SAD: Konflict dengan PT Asiatic Tuntas!”, Jambi Ekspres, 21 March 2014.
95 Ibid.
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thorised by the village administration, and the buyers, who were issued temporary certificates, 
were able to settle on it and farm, even thought it was technically part of the PT Jammer Tulen 
concession area.
With SAD113, it is a different case. Here the sales of land appear to be a systematic fund-rais-
ing tool that also helps raise the number of protestors. The buyers, almost all of them migrants, 
are told that one condition of getting a plot (kapling) is to take part in the struggle (perjuangan) 
and they put the funds up front. Many end up losing their money and getting no land, as shown 
below. 
For example, in the process of verification at the Batang Hari adat office in February 2014, 61 
non-SAD came forward to complain that they had bought land from SAD members for a total 
of Rp. 421.7 million—or roughly Rp 7 million ($636) per family. Now they were being told they 
had to leave, but they could not take advantage of the land being offered on the 2,000 ha because 
it was only for those verified as indigenous.96 
A more detailed case involves a Javanese man, Sukirno (not his real name). In 2013, he was 
approached by someone who offered to sell him land in Bungku at the very reasonable price 
of Rp.2.5 million ($227) per kapling (two ha). The only condition was that Sukirno would have 
to take part in various kinds of political actions. Sukirno agreed and bought four kapling in 
the names of himself, his wife, his daughter and his son-in-law. All four took part in various 
demonstrations, mostly in Jambi but Sukirno participated in at least one PRD/STN action in 
Jakarta. He persuaded other friends to buy land on the same terms: it was cheap, and taking part 
in demonstrations was not a heavy price to pay. The problem was that the organisers never let 
up on their demands for money and by February 2014 he had paid several million rupiah above 
his initial down payment for the land, which in fact he has never seen and to which he has no 
clear title.97
SAD113 leaders vigorously deny that they are selling land to migrants. They explain the pres-
ence of so many migrants in their ranks as an alliance with families that came initially to work 
in the timber concessions, bought or acquired land in the process, and then lost it to PT Asiatic. 
According to a SAD113 leader, they have just as much right to restitution as indigenous SAD 
members.98 This explanation suggests that all the migrants who have joined with SAD113 have 
been in the area for generations, but it is clear that land sales are responsible in part for a new 
influx.
B. Oil Palm “Theft”
From the beginning of mediation efforts, PT Asiatic complained that palm oil fruit was being 
systematically stolen by the truckload from its trees. Some of the farmers, particularly in the 
southern part of the concession area, say it is not theft if the land was stolen from them in the 
first place and especially if its current legal status is unclear; they will continue to take it and sell 
to whomever they like. They also argue that they should not be penalised, because a 2011 Con-
stitutional Court decision removed two articles of the 2004 Plantations Law that had sometimes 
been used to punish theft.99
But stolen palm oil is a big business that goes beyond just trying to avenge past land grabs 
or support the struggle to get it back. There appears to be a large black market in “stolen” palm 
fruit, in which the beneficiaries are local non-SAD businesspeople, known as “Korean tycoons” 
96 “Perkembangan Verifikasi Adat,” signed by M. Rasyid, 26 February 2014, statement posted in the Batanghari Lembaga 
Adat.
97 IPAC interview, neighbor of “Sukirno”, 23 March 2014. 
98 IPAC interview, SAD113 leader, Jambi, 8 March 2014.
99 Colchester et al, op.cit. p.38.
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even though they have nothing to do with Korea.100 They reportedly buy up fruit at far below 
market rates from SAD leaders who organise the harvest operations and hire the pickers and 
trucks.101 The pickers are more likely than not to be non-SAD, sometimes coming in as day 
labourers, and they operate in small teams, on the instruction of individual brokers. The prob-
lem has become even more complicated with the settling of SAD families on PT Jammer Tulen 
concession, because if before, it was the company whose trees were being harvested, it is now 
other SAD families who have taken up the company’s offer who are now losing fruit to these 
harvesters.
One court case from 2010 illustrates how the process works. In July 2010, sixteen men were 
arrested from the Mentilingin hamlet, in the southern part of the PT Asiatic concession, and 
charged with theft. Police accused Ardani, the Bungku village notable mentioned above, of be-
ing the mastermind. Ardani’s brother Budi was the broker of the sales but also someone who 
employed palm oil workers on a piecework basis of Rp100,000 ($10) per ton of picked fruit. One 
witness, a worker who had lived at Budi’s house, said he had been paid Rp.500,000 but Budi still 
owed him Rp5 million (about $500). None of the workers had any understanding of where land 
boundaries were or at what point they went in or out of Ardani’s group’s customary land. PT 
Asiatic claimed the total loss to the company from the operation in question was $700, hardly a 
huge dent in the company’s finances.
The cycle of “thefts” and arrests adds another dimension to the conflict, exacerbating it in 
three ways.
First, in the eyes of the community, arrests for theft epitomise injustice: poor fruit pickers 
harvesting on what they see as their own land are jailed but those responsible for land grabs 
and violence go free. The local prison is always full: in 2010, the defence team for one group of 
pickers noted that of about 140 inmates of the Batang Hari district prison, about 80 were in for 
palm oil theft.102
Second, the arrests involve company security guards working together with local police, re-
inforcing a widely held perception that the police effectively act as an extension of the company. 
When the “thieves” face beating or extortion after arrest, as not infrequently happens, the sense 
of anger deepens.
And third, such arrests frequently lead to demonstrations in support of those detained that 
turn violent.
It was a palm oil “theft” that triggered one of the biggest outbreaks of violence on the PT Asi-
atic concession in August 2011, when officers from the paramilitary police unit Brimob seized a 
truck of a man they claimed was involved in illegal sales of fruit. Over the next two days, clashes 
with the community led to a wholly disproportionate response by police and security guards: 
the systematic bulldozing of houses and displacement of 83 families.103 As noted above, the in-
cident triggered a new complaint from IFC/CAO to Wilmar.
In the most recent outbreak of violence, a young man named Titus Simanjuntak, 28, an eth-
nic Batak from Sibolga, North Sumatra, was arrested on 5 March 2014 for stealing palm fruit by 
a group of soldiers who came to his house. He was then put in a patrol vehicle to be taken to a PT 
Asiatic security post. Along the way, the car stopped and his captors took him out, and kicked 
him, then beat him with rifle butts until he vomited blood.104 When they reached the post, he 
100 The term used is toke Korea, and different sources defined it slightly differently. One said the word “Korean” was used to 
denote anyone who paid cash up front, before the harvest. 
101 The company said it paid Rp.1,800 per kg but the black market purchasers pay only Rp.600.
102 Public Interest Lawyer Network (PIL-NET), “Pembelaan (Pledooi) Terdakwa Ardani bin Sayuti”, Muara Buliam, Jambi, 13 
April 2011.
103 For a description of events, see “Mediation: a strategy or a final objective?” op.cit, p.15.
104 “Kisah Titus, Petani Jambi Yang Jadi Korban Penculikan TNI”, Berdikari Online, 9 March 2014.
24 Indigenous Rights vs Agrarian Reform in Indonesia: A Case Study from Jambi ©2014 IPAC
was reportedly beaten again, this time with rattan. On 2 April, military police arrested six sol-
diers from the district military command in Batang Hari (KODIM 0415) and formally indicted 
them for the unlawful arrest of Titus and subsequent assault.105
Shortly after Titus was arrested, a Javanese friend of his named Puji led a group of some two 
dozen men to demand his release. According to a company official, Puji was carrying a jerrycan 
of gasoline, ready to set the company buildings alight. He was overpowered by security guards 
and beaten senseless, then thrown on a truck, handcuffed, and taken to the local police hospital 
in Jambi. There he was left on the floor, untreated, until he died. Five others in his group were 
injured. 
Puji had reportedly recently been released from prison for cutting off the hand of a company 
security guard in an earlier confrontation. There may therefore have been an element of revenge 
involved in his treatment. Police took the case seriously; five security guards from PT Asiatic 
were quickly arrested and charged under Article 170 of the criminal code -- violent assault, lead-
ing to death. It remains to be seen how they will fare in court. 
VIII.  LESSONS FROM JAMBI
The lessons from SAD113 are a sobering reminder of just how complicated these conflicts are.
1.  The longer these conflicts are allowed to fester, the more complicated they become. 
The SAD113 group started out as a relatively small, coherent group of farmers defined by their 
place of origin and descent group. Over time, it splintered into several different components, 
while opening its ranks to many non-SAD groups. By early 2014, PRD/STN was claiming that 
SAD113 was composed of 1,500 families, which was statistically close to impossible, if they all 
were “indigenous”. At the same time, Pak Nurman, the community leader who had initially 
worked on behalf of the whole group, went off on his own to stake a claim to a particular section 
of land, and when that did not work, embraced the peasant union’s tactics of using adat claims 
on behalf of a larger group. Along the way, the meaning of “indigenous” or masyakarat adat 
became increasingly unclear.
2.  No government agency has both the mandate and the power to effectively adjudi-
cate land conflicts. One reason why these conflicts seem to go on and on interminably is that 
different offices, at different levels of government, have a piece of the problem but no one has 
responsibility for all of it. At different times in SAD113 conflict, the initiative seemed to be with 
the centre, the province or the district respectively but it kept changing. Even at the district level, 
the attitude of the land office was not necessarily in sync with the police chief. Not a single agen-
cy had the capacity to step back and assess what needed to be done, let alone to make it happen; 
civil society lobbying was crucial to prompt any kind of government response. From 2012 a clear 
solution was on the table, but it was contingent on the company funding a re-measuring process. 
Apparently not a single government agency had either the power to compel the company to pay 
or the authority to allocate funding from a different source. The BPN seems to be powerless. 
According to the Jambi provincial secretary, 
We wrote to the central office of BPN recommending that the concession be reviewed. 
PBN agreed and told the company it would have to set aside funds for the area to be 
re-measured. PT Asiatic never responded, and there’s nothing that BPN can do about it. 
We sent a letter to PT Asiatic three times, asking them to turn over the funds. In theory, 
the government could revoke the permit of the company but it has no interest in doing 
105  “Aniaya Petani, 6 Anggota TNI Jadi Tersangka”, Kompas, 3 April 2014.
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so. At the province level, we can only facilitate, we have no authority. It is clear our efforts 
aren’t working.106
One source said that in general, it was easier to resolve conflicts where the lead government 
agency was the Forestry Ministry rather than BPN because at least there tended to be clear land 
coordinates involved.107
3.  The solution to conflict most often lies with the company. In some ways this is an 
unfortunate lesson, because it suggests that civil society efforts and government regulations 
ultimately count for less than a corporate change of heart. But it also suggests that consumer 
pressure and groups like RSPO are useful because the certification process changes the stakes 
for the companies involved. Responsible Sourcing Guidelines also help. The IFC/CAO process 
unquestionably helped push PT Asiatic to understand that it had no choice but to find a solution 
– even if it was not the one that Setara and its clients were aiming for. 
In Jambi’s biggest success story of a resolved land conflict, the solution only became possi-
ble when the company decided to call in a mediator. The conflict involved a group of farmers 
who had lost their smallholder rubber plots when an industrial tree plantation called PT Wira 
Karyasakti (WKS) linked to the Sinar Mas group began operations in 2006 in Senyerang, Jambi. 
The mediator involved, The Forest Trust or TFT, had worked with Sinar Mas in the past so there 
was an element of trust already established. The agreement led to a solution that involved the 
payment of compensation through a cooperative and the resumption of rubber-planting on land 
that will be held collectively, through the cooperative, rather than distributed individually to the 
farmers.108
The popularity of mediation efforts has led to the establishment of a new network, the Impar-
tial Mediator Network, specifically for resolving land and resource conflicts in Indonesia.109 The 
men and women involved are all experienced mediators, most of them from NGO backgrounds. 
Whether or not they are called into service still depends on the willingness of the company to 
have them. But the responsibility of settling conflicts should be the government’s, not the private 
sector’s, and it needs to be pro-active rather than reactive – a reason for strengthening BPN.
4.  Confrontation – and sometimes violence – on the part of activists works. One lesson 
that many of the agrarian activists have learned well is that confrontation, and sometimes vi-
olent confrontation, gets attention when peaceful protests do not. Any arrest is likely to lead to 
accusations by NGOs that activists are being “criminalised”, without regard for the circumstanc-
es of the case, and violence will often bring in television cameras of what otherwise would be a 
local issue that would get no attention. Even in the success story, mentioned above, the company 
only decided on mediation after an outbreak of violence in 2010 which one person was killed. If 
peaceful protests get nowhere and violent protests lead to change, then there is a clear incentive 
for more violence. This should be a lesson to the government to resolve conflicts quickly rather 
than allowing them to fester, but as long as there are multiple agencies with confusing mandates, 
this will be easier said than done.
5.  Violence on the part of security forces is counterproductive. In dealing with land con-
flicts, security forces are frequently confronting angry crowds. They need to be able to defend 
themselves, but there is never justification for gratuitous beatings of suspects after arrest or dem-
olition of homes – and in almost every case where this has happened, it has made the conflict 
106  Interview with Syahrasadin, secretary of Jambi provincial government (sekertaris daerah, sekda), Jambi, 10 February 2014.
107  IPAC interview, Agung Wiyono, The Forest Trust, 17 February 2014.
108  Some observers suggest that this case is not an unqualified success. A detailed evaluation is in process by Forest Peoples 
Programme, an international NGO.
109 The Impartial Mediator Network’s website is www.imenetwork.org.
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worse. There may be justification in some circumstances for evictions, but it is the government’s 
responsibility to ensure that these are handled without violence or looting; with adequate notice; 
and with provision for alternative housing. 
6. Agrarian reform is an important and legitimate goal, but exploiting land conflicts is 
not the only way to pursue it. Proponents of reform cite growing land scarcity and increasing 
concentrations of land in agribusiness concessions as an argument for setting minimum and 
maximum limits on landholdings. They note that BPN figures show that 56 per cent of assets in 
the form of land, property and plantations is held by just 0.2 per cent of the population. They 
argue that only through more systematic redistribution of land, as was promised by the Yud-
hoyono government in 2006, can rural poverty be addressed, and they may be right.110 But land 
conflicts can also be exploited for political ends. In the SAD113 case, the most obvious player 
was the PRD/STN, whose leadership is open about wanting to build a political base for 2019. 
It was only the largest of the peasant groups fielding candidates through mainstream parties in 
Jambi for the 2014 election.111 Political objectives do not make the struggle for agrarian reform 
illegitimate but they can complicate the situation on the ground for other parties. In the Jam-
bi case, PRD/STN’s tactics succeeded where mediation did not in getting central government 
acknowledgment of the right of SAD113 to its land. But if the number of claimants thanks to 
those same tactics is triple what it was eighteen months ago, what happens with distribution if 
the land is eventually returned and how are differences between the original claimants and the 
newcomers resolved?
7.  Indigenous rights legislation needs to be accompanied by the strengthening of state 
institutions that can fairly assess and adjudicate land claims. Given institutional weaknesses 
that exist at present, any effort to return large amount of land to indigenous control may lead 
to the creation of multiple adat organisations purporting to represent the same group, more 
sales of land on spec, and commodification of indigenous status. It is the task of government 
and lawmakers to address these problems proactively, working closely with civil society to build 
safeguards into new legislation and move toward a “one-stop shop” for addressing conflicts. The 
phenomenon of widespread internal migration needs to be better understood at the same time, 
so that indigenous rights does not mean migrant disenfranchisement or discrimination, and 
new conflicts between migrants and locals are not created.
IX. CONCLUSION
Jambi, like most other provinces across Sumatra, is awash in conflicts. The provincial govern-
ment says there are thirteen major disputes; the environmental organisation Walhi says there are 
110  See “Reforma Agraria Prioritas”, Kompas, 7 April 2014 and Gunawan, “Reforma Agraria Pasca SBY”, Kompas, 11 April 
2014.
111  Another group active in Jambi, the Indonesian Farmers’ Union (Serikat Petani Indonesia, SPI), is allied with La Via 
Campesina, the transnational peasant movement that sees many aspects of international trade and finance as facilitating 
corporate land grabs and inherently inimical to small-scale farmers. SPI’s signature struggle in Jambi is on behalf of some 
12,000 to 15,000 migrant farmers growing coffee in Kerinci Seblat national park who have been targeted by conservation-
ists, indigenous groups and some local politicians. In the April 2014 elections, SPI, which had in the past forbidden its 
members from standing for elective office and criticised STN for being too preoccupied with politics, reluctantly agreed to 
let two of its Jambi members contest district council seats after pressure from within its own ranks. A third organisation, 
Jambi Peasants Union (Persatuan Petani Jambi, PPJ) is local but affiliated to the national Consortium for Agrarian Reform 
and the Indonesian Peasant Alliance (Aliansi Petani Indonesia, API). It helped organise the farmers involved in the case 
that was successfully resolved with the help of The Forest Trust (above). The head of PPJ ran as a legislative candidate for 
the Great Indonesia Movement party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) after being urged to do so by PPJ members who 
said the farmers needed someone to articulate their problems within the provincial legislature. 
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more than 300.112 Many of these seem intractable, but with the right institutions and mediators, 
many more could be resolved.
Indonesia desperately needs a better mechanism for adjudication of land conflicts. Some 
Indonesian activists would like to see a new body similar to South Africa’s Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights established, in which individuals or groups whose land was acquired 
for concessions during the Soeharto years could make claims against the state but would also be 
urged to negotiate a settlement with the goal of obtaining “equitable redress”. Rather than create 
a new body, however, it would probably make more sense to strengthen the mandate, powers 
and budget of BPN, the national land agency, so that a decision like the one to require PT Asiatic 
to fund a mapping process could be immediately enforced.
The “One Map Movement” of the Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and Manage-
ment of Development (UKP4), set up by President Yudhoyono, needs to be endorsed and con-
tinued by Indonesia’s next president. The program, which focuses on better spatial planning, 
including participative mapping, as a way of resolving land conflicts, may help prevent future 
conflicts; it will be less useful in resolving existing ones.
The Impartial Mediators Network, the network of respected Indonesian NGO leaders with 
experience in complicated negotiation, needs to become better known, with success stories 
shared both in the corporate community, among civil society groups, and within the Indonesian 
government. It is important to learn lessons from the failures as well as the successes, but the 
conditions that allow mediation to succeed need to be understood by all parties.
Finally, the Indonesian government and civil society need to have a clear appreciation of how 
indigenous rights can be exploited and co-opted for other objectives. 
Indonesia will soon have a new president and parliament. Understanding the depth of Indone-
sia’s land problems and the urgency of addressing them should be at the top of its agenda.
112  “300 Konflik Belum Tuntas”, Jambi Independent, 10 March 2014.
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Appendix: Map of PT Asiatic Persada and Jambi Province
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that 
accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to 
explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—
and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change. 
In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful 
settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to 
poverty alleviation.
We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist 
and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one 
form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to 
the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check 
secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples 
of best practices where appropriate.
We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for 
Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website 
is www.understandingconflict.org.
